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The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence
A Never-Ending Necessity
James M. Olson
to my commandments! Then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea.” —Isaiah 48:18
The need for counterintelligence (CI) has not gone away, nor is it likely to. The end of the Cold War has not even meant an end to the CI threat from the former Soviet Union. The foreign intelligence service of the new democratic Russia, the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossii (SVRR), has remained active against us. It was the SVRR that took over the handling of Aldrich Ames from its predecessor, the KGB, in 1991. It was the SVRR that ran CIA officer Harold James Nicholson against us from 1994 to 1996. It was the SVRR that was handling FBI special agent Earl Pitts when he was arrested for espionage in 1996. It was the SVRR that planted a listening device in a conference room of the State Department in Washington in the summer of 1999. And it was the SVRR that was handling FBI special agent Robert Hanssen when he was arrested on charges of espionage in February 2001.
The Russians are not alone. There have been serious, well-publicized concerns about Chinese espionage in the United States. The Department of Energy significantly increased security at its national laboratories last year in response to allegations that China had stolen US nuclear weapons secrets.
Paul Redmond, the former Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Counterintelligence at the CIA, told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in early 2000 that a total of at least 41 countries are trying to spy on the United States. Besides mentioning Russia, China, and Cuba, he also cited several “friends,” including France, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. He warned of a pervasive CI threat to the United States.
The United States, as the world’s only remaining superpower, will be the constant target of jealousies, resentments, rivalries, and challenges to its economic well-being, security, and leadership in the world. This inevitably means that the United States will be the target of large-scale foreign espionage.
A Choice Assignment
When I joined the CIA, one of my first interim assignments was with the old CI Staff. I found it fascinating. I was assigned to write a history of the Rote Kapelle, the Soviet espionage network in Nazi-occupied Western Europe during World War II.
With its expanded computer power, NSA was breaking out the actual messages sent between the NKVD center in Moscow and the clandestine radios of the various cells in Western Europe. Incredibly, these messages came to me.
There I was, a brand new junior officer, literally the first person in the CIA to see the day-to-day traffic from these life-and-death operations. I was deeply affected by the fear, heroism, and drama in these messages. Above all, I felt privileged to have been given such an opportunity.
Building on an earlier study of the Rote Kapelle by the CI Staff, I completed a draft several months later that incorporated the new material. To my great surprise, this study was well received by my immediate superiors, and I was told that I was to be rewarded with a personal interview and congratulations from James Jesus Angleton, the legendary head of the CI Staff from 1954 to 1974.
Angleton’s office was on the second floor of the Original Headquarters Building. I was first ushered into an outer office, where Angleton’s aides briefed me on how to conduct myself. Then I went alone into the inner sanctum.
The room was dark, the curtains were drawn, and there was just one small lamp on Angleton’s desk. I later heard that Angleton had eye trouble and that the light hurt his eyes, but I was convinced the real reason for the semidarkness was to add to his mystique. It certainly worked on me!
I nervously briefed Angleton on my study, and he listened without interrupting, just nodding from time to time. When I finished, he methodically attacked every one of my conclusions. Didn’t I know the traffic was a deception? Hadn’t it occurred to me that Leopold Trepper, the leader of the Rote Kapelle, was a German double? He went on and on, getting further and further out.
Even I, as a brand new officer, could tell that this great mind, this CI genius, had lost it. I thought he was around the bend. It was one of the most bizarre experiences of my career.
When the meeting was over, I was glad to get out of there, and I vowed to myself that I would never go anywhere near CI again. I did not keep that vow. In my overseas assignments with the Agency, I found myself drawn toward Soviet CI operations. Nothing seemed to quicken my pulse more, and I was delighted when I was called back to Headquarters in 1989 to join the new Counterintelligence Center (CIC) as Ted Price’s deputy. When Ted moved upstairs in early 1991 to become the Associate Deputy Director for Operations, I was named chief of the Center.
Today, many years after that initial disagreeable encounter with CI, I find it hard to believe that it is actually my picture on the wall of the CIC conference room at CIA Headquarters, where the photos of all former CIA counterintelligence chiefs are displayed. There I am, number seven in a row that begins with Angleton.
So, after a career that ended up being far more CI-oriented than I could ever have imagined, I would like to offer some personal observations in the form of “The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence.” I have chosen the form of commandments because I believe the basic rules of CI are immutable and should be scrupulously followed. In my view, it makes little difference whether the adversary is the Russians, the Cubans, the East Germans, the Chinese, or someone else. It likewise makes little difference whether we are talking about good CI practices in 1985 or in 2005. Unfortunately, as I watch US CI today, I am increasingly concerned that the principles I consider fundamental to effective CI are not being followed as carefully and consistently as they should be.
These commandments were not handed down to me from a mountaintop, and I make no claim that they are inspired or even definitive. They are simply the culmination, for what they are worth, of my experience. They are intended primarily for my fellow practitioners in CI today, but also for any younger officers in the Intelligence Community (IC) who might someday want to join us.
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The First Commandment: Be Offensive
CI that is passive and defensive will fail. We cannot hunker down in a defensive mode and wait for things to happen. I believe we are spending far too much money on fences, safes, alarms, and other purely defensive measures to protect our secrets. That is not how we have been hurt in recent years. Spies have hurt us. Our CI mindset should be relentlessly offensive. We need to go after our CI adversaries.
Aggressive double agent (DA) operations are essential to any CI program, but not the predictable, hackneyed kind we have so often pursued. We need to push our bright and imaginative people to produce clever new scenarios for controlled operations, and we need more of them. The opposition services should be kept constantly off guard so that they never suspect that we have actually controlled the operations they believe they initiated from the beginning. When the requirements, modus operandi, and personality objectives of the DA operation have been achieved, we should in a greater number of cases pitch the opposition case officer. If only one out of 10 or 20 of these recruitments takes, it is worth it. And CI professionals, of course, should not rely exclusively on their own efforts. They should constantly prod their HUMINT colleagues to identify, target, and recruit officers from the opposition intelligence services. The key to CI success is penetration. For every American spy, there are several members of the opposition service who know who he or she is. No matter what it takes, we have to have penetrations.
We should operate aggressively against the nontraditional as well as the traditional adversaries. How many examples do we need of operations against Americans by so-called friendly countries to convince us that the old intelligence adage is correct: there are friendly nations, but no friendly intelligence services. If we suspect for whatever reason that the operatives of a foreign intelligence service, friend or foe, are operating against us, we should test them. We should dress up an enticing morsel, made to order for that specific target, and send it by them. If they take it, we have learned something we needed to know, and we have an operation. If they reject it, as true friends should, we have learned something, too. In either event, because we are testing a “friend,” plausible deniability has to be strictly preserved. Every foreign service is a potential nontraditional adversary; no service should get a lifetime pass from US offensive CI operations.
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The Second Commandment: Honor Your Professionals
It has been true for years—to varying degrees throughout the IC—that CI professionals have not been favored, to the extent they deserved, with promotions, assignments, awards, praise, esteem, or other recognition. The truth is that CI officers are not popular. They are not always welcome when they walk in. They usually bring bad news. They are easy marks to criticize when things go wrong. Their successes are their failures. If they catch a spy, they are roasted for having taken so long. If they are not catching anyone, why not? What have they done with all that money they spent on CI? It is no-win.
For much of my career, many of our best people avoided becoming CI specialists. CI was not prestigious. It had a bad reputation. It was not fast track. It did not lead to promotions or good assignments. Angleton left a distasteful legacy that for years discredited the CI profession. Ted Price did more than anyone else in the Agency to reverse that trend and to rehabilitate CI as a respected professional discipline.
Nevertheless, that battle is still not completely won. We have to do more to get our CI people promoted, recognized, and respected so that our best young officers will be attracted to follow us into what we know is a noble profession and where the need is so great.
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The Third Commandment: Own the Street
This is so fundamental to CI, but it is probably the least followed of the commandments. Any CI program worthy of the name has to be able to engage the opposition on the street, the field of play for espionage. And when we do go to the street, we have to be the best service there. If we are beaten on the street, it is worse than not having been there at all.
For years, we virtually conceded the streets of the world’s capitals, including the major espionage centers, to the KGB, the GRU, and the East European services because we either did not know how to do it or we were not willing to pay the price for a thoroughly professional, reliable, full-time, local surveillance capability.
Opposition intelligence officers have to be watched, known meeting areas have to be observed, and, when an operation goes down—often on short notice—undetectable surveillance has to cover it, identify the participants, and obtain evidence.
This capability is expensive—selection, training, vehicles, photo gear, video, radios, safe apartments, observation posts, and on and on—but, if we do not have it, we will be a second-rate CI service and will not break the major cases.
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The Fourth Commandment: Know Your History
I am very discouraged when I talk to young CI officers today to find how little they know about the history of American CI. CI is a difficult and dangerous discipline. Many good, well-meaning CI people have gone wrong and made horrendous mistakes. Their failures in most cases are well documented, but the lessons are lost if our officers do not read the CI literature.
I find it inconceivable that any CI practitioner today could ply his or her trade without an in-depth knowledge of the Angleton era. Have our officers read Mangold? Have they read Legend and Wilderness of Mirrors? Do they know the Loginov case, HONETOL, MHCHAOS, Nosenko, Pollard, and Shadrin? Are they familiar with Aspillaga and the Cuban DA debacle? Have they examined our mistakes in the Ames and Howard cases? Are they staying current with recent releases like The Mitrokhin Archive and The Haunted Wood?
I believe it is an indispensable part of the formation of any American CI officer—and certainly a professional obligation—to study the CI failures of the past, to reflect on them, and to make sure they are not repeated.
The many CI courses being offered now are a positive step, but there will never be a substitute for a personal commitment on the part of our CI professionals to read their history, usually on their own time at home.
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The Fifth Commandment: Do Not Ignore Analysis
Analysis has too often been the stepchild of CI. Throughout the CI community, we have fairly consistently understaffed it. We have sometimes tried to make it up as we go along. We have tried to do it on the cheap.
Generally speaking, operators make bad analysts. We are different kinds of people. Operators are actors, doers, movers and shakers; we are quick, maybe a little impulsive, maybe a little “cowboy.” Our best times are away from our desks. We love the street. Research and analysis is really not our thing—and when we have tried to do it, we have not been good at it.
True analysts are different. They love it. They are more cerebral, patient, and sedentary. They find things we could not. They write better.
A lot of CI programs in the past have tried to make operators double as their own analysts. As a result, in the United States, CI analysis historically has been the weakest part of the business. Professional CI analysts have been undervalued and underappreciated.
A good CI program will recruit and train true analysts in sizable numbers. I do not think it would be excessive as a rule of thumb in a top notch CI service to be evenly divided between operators and analysts. Very few of our US CI agencies come anywhere close to that ratio.
Wonderful things happen when good analysts in sufficient numbers pore over our DA reports, presence lists, SIGINT, audio and teltap transcripts, maps, travel data, and surveillance reports. They find the clues, make the connections, and focus our efforts in the areas that will be most productive.
Many parts of the US CI community have gotten the message and have incorporated trained analysts into their operations, but others have not. Across the board, we still have serious shortfalls in good, solid CI analysis.
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The Sixth Commandment: Do Not Be Parochial
More harm probably has been done to US CI over the years by interagency sniping and obstruction than by our enemies. I remember when the CIA and the FBI did not even talk to each other—and both had disdain for the military services. It is no wonder that CI was a shambles and that some incredibly damaging spies went uncovered for so long.
Occasionally in my career, I encountered instances of sarcasm or outright bad mouthing of other US Government agencies by my officers. That kind of attitude and cynicism infected our junior officers and got in the way of cooperation. These comments often were intended to flaunt our supposed “superiority” by demeaning the capabilities of the other organizations. I dealt with these situations by telling the officers to “knock it off,” and I would encourage other CI supervisors around the community to do the same.
CI is so difficult, even in the best of circumstances, that the only way to do it is together. We should not let personalities, or jealousies, or turf battles get in the way of our common mission. Our colleagues in our sister services are as dedicated, professional, hardworking, and patriotic as we are, and they deserve our respect and cooperation. The best people I have known in my career have been CI people, regardless of their organizational affiliation. So let us be collegial.
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The Seventh Commandment: Train Your People
CI is a distinct discipline and an acquired skill. It is not automatically infused in us when we get our wings as case officers. It is not just a matter of applying logic and common sense to operations, but is instead a highly specialized way of seeing things and analyzing them. CI has to be learned.
I do not know how many times in my career I have heard, “No, we do not really need a separate CI section. We are all CI officers; we’ll do our own CI.” That is a recipe for compromise and failure.
There are no substitutes for professional CI officers, and only extensive, regular, and specialized CI training can produce them. Such training is expensive, so whenever possible we should do it on a Community basis to avoid duplication and to ensure quality.
CI is a conglomerate of several disciplines and skills. A typical operation, for example, might include analysts, surveillance specialists, case officers, technical experts, and DA specialists. Each area requires its own specialized training curriculum. It takes a long time to develop CI specialists, and that means a sustained investment in CI training. We are getting better, but we are not there yet.
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The Eighth Commandment: Do Not Be Shoved Aside
There are people in the intelligence business and other groups in the US Government who do not particularly like CI officers. CI officers have a mixed reputation. We see problems everywhere. We can be overzealous. We get in the way of operations. We cause headaches. We are the original “black hatters.”
Case officers want their operations to be bona fide. Senior operations managers do not want to believe that their operations are controlled or penetrated by the opposition. There is a natural human tendency on the part of both case officers and senior operations managers to resist outside CI scrutiny. They believe that they are practicing good CI themselves and do not welcome being second-guessed or told how to run their operations by so-called CI specialists who are not directly involved in the operations. I have seen far more examples of this in my CI career than I care to remember.
By the same token, defense and intelligence contractors and bureaucrats running sensitive US Government programs have too often tended to minimize CI threats and to resist professional CI intervention. CI officers, in their view, stir up problems and overreact to them. Their “successes” in preventing CI problems are invisible and impossible to measure, but their whistle blowing when problems are uncovered generate tremendous heat. It is not surprising that they are often viewed as a net nuisance.
When necessary, a CI service has to impose itself on the organizations and groups it is assigned to protect. A CI professional who is locked out or invited in only when it is convenient to the host cannot do his job.
My advice to my CI colleagues has always been this: “If you are blocked by some senior, obtuse, anti-CI officer, go around him or through him by going to higher management. And document all instances of denied access, lack of cooperation, or other obstruction to carrying out your CI mission. If not, when something goes wrong, as it likely will in that kind of situation, you in CI will take the blame.”
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The Ninth Commandment: Do Not Stay Too Long
CI is a hazardous profession. There should be warning signs on the walls: “A steady diet of CI can be dangerous to your health.”
I do not believe anyone should make an entire, uninterrupted career of CI. We all who work in CI have seen it: the old CI hand who has gotten a bit spooky. It is hard to immerse oneself daily in the arcane and twisted world of CI without falling prey eventually to creeping paranoia, distortion, warping, and overzealousness in one’s thinking. It is precisely these traits that led to some of the worst CI disasters in our history. Angleton and his coterie sadly succumbed, with devastating results. Others in the CIA and elsewhere have as well. The danger is always there.
My wife, who was working at the CIA when I met her, was well acquainted with this reputation of CI and the stories about its practitioners. When I was serving overseas and received the cable offering me the position as Ted Price’s deputy in the new Counterintelligence Center, I discussed it with her that evening at home. Her response, I thought, was right on the mark: “Okay, but do not stay too long.”
Sensible and productive CI needs lots of ventilation and fresh thinking. There should be constant flowthrough. Non-CI officers should be brought in regularly on rotational tours. I also believe it is imperative that a good CI service build in rotational assignments outside CI for its CI specialists. They should go spend two or three years with the operators or with the other groups they are charged to protect. They will come back refreshed, smarter, and less likely to fall into the nether world of professional CI: the school of doublethink, the us-against-them mindset, the nothing-is-what-it-seems syndrome, or the wilderness of mirrors.
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The Tenth Commandment: Never Give Up
The tenth and last commandment is the most important. What if the Ames mole hunters had quit after eight years instead of going into the ninth? What if, in my own experience, we had discontinued a certain surveillance operation after five months instead of continuing into the sixth? CI history is full of such examples.
The FBI is making cases against Americans today that involved espionage committed in the 1960s and 1970s. The Army’s Foreign Counterintelligence Activity is doing the same. The name of the game in CI is persistence. CI officers who are not patient need not apply. There is no statute of limitations for espionage, and we should not create one by our own inaction. Traitors should know that they will never be safe and will never have a peaceful night’s sleep. I applauded my CI colleagues in the FBI when I read not long ago of their arrest in Florida of a former US Army Reserve colonel for alleged espionage against the United States many years earlier. They obviously never gave up.
If we keep a CI investigation alive and stay on it, the next defector, the next penetration, the next tip, the next surveillance, or the next clue will break it for us.
If there were ever to be a mascot for US counterintelligence, it should be the pit bull.
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In Conclusion
These are my ten commandments of CI. Other CI professionals will have their own priorities and exhortations and will disagree with mine. That is as it should be, because as a country and as an Intelligence Community we need a vigorous debate on the future direction of US CI. Not everyone will agree with the specifics, or even the priorities. What we should agree on, however, is that strong CI has to be a national priority. Recent news reports from Los Alamos, Washington, and elsewhere have again underscored the continuing need for CI vigilance.
James M. Olson served in the Directorate of Operations and is now on the faculty of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.
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„School from Păltiniş” no we can send by singled out stoning. Ultimately, Noica, as an „agent supervisor ideologically” or „political” war of the Intelligence Service, has taken on the mission to form a number of 10 propagandişti of the system of Western values (in the case of the UK, we cannot speak of one Catholic even!). Each of the ten in turn … and so forth, until the coagulation of a conductive elite.
Now, don’t think Noica i gathered on the ten and he has held lectures …
Devout follower of the theory of elites, philosopher was easy to sugestionat to create a school in which to form disciples. Noica said: „I dream of a school in which do not surrender, as speaking, nothing. To live quiet and cuviincios, in a fortress, and young people, few young people of the world, to come there to escape the tyranny of profesoratului. For everything and everyone I give lessons. Everything must be learned on the outside and on the outside, and the only thing that’s allowed once in a while is to ask questions. But you don’t see that they have and they said something, confessed to anything? And you don’t see that we don’t have always have what to say? We are only mijlocitori between them and themselves … A State of mind, it must be given to others; no content, no advice, no doctrines. ”
It was supposed to become Noica, a creator of a State of mind …
Be reached on a pilgrimage, a few dozens of followers. A list of approximate would comprise between 30 and 50 names.
Steady, sharp and, most often without witnesses, was his presence in the vicinity of two of these Noica: Gabriel Liiceanu and Andrei Pleşu.
At Păltiniş is also arranged periodically and seminars. They were frequented, more or less constantly by [order is alphabetic]: Paul Anghel, Constantin Barbu, Francisca Băltăceanu, Aurel Brumaru, Andrei Cornea, Alexandru Dragomir, Marta Gutu, Andrew Justin Hossu, Dan Jacob, Thomas Kleininger, Şerban Nicolau, Octavian Nistor, Ion Pillat Slipper, Monica, George Purdea, Victor Stoichiţă Surdu, Mihai Alexandru Şora, Marin Tarangul, Sorin Vieru, Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu.
Noica sincerely believed that if he manages to create an elite, it will be necessary in the management structure of the society and will „change vs. Romania”. His idealism Noica was astute speculated. In his case i have had in mind the profile of moral and philosophical beliefs, the direct effects of its intrinsic value in the formation of pesonalităţi, which lead to social-political developments with the sense and historical meanings. Cam so politically strategic intelligence work in the era of the cold war.
It’s good to know that both Noica and other great personalities haven’t rejected anything of what they circles perceived as being constructive, beneficial and necessary, according to their beliefs.
Gabriel Liiceanu and Andrei Pleşu-featuring me contraspionajului British master of that time-and-increased frequency of visits to the „Villa 23” (photo) when they unearthed Noica possibilities of his assist to obtain scholarships in the West. Monthly, on weekends, she used to go food, press releases and news. In the attic for filosofului or tours by listening to his surroundings, Noica, expozeele on subjects apparently random and related dialogs. Noica philosophical issues them and evaluate opinions. Andrei Pleşu was the disciple listener and painstaking. Gabriel Liiceanu was more audacious, sometimes even slightly cocky, what who revile against contradictions.
Gabriel Liiceanu
Of course, it raises the question: „by who and how he perfected Noica getting scholarships and nomination of the two disciples?”. Very cleverly, with no official involvement, Noica gave a signal of German foundations of British occupation zone of Germany R.F.. However, in the name of the mutual interest of the development of good relations, Roman-German, they did all the work. The Department did not knew it nor the recipients of the scholarships.
Now, naturally, is to be requested in connection with the manner in which Noica, isolated from Păltiniş, able to communicate outdoors? His relationship with people special services Noica of Its Majestatii Queen Elizabeth II was finding blatant and object. Attached aero of Great Britain to Bucharest used, also other members of the Military or Embassy Ataşaturii, to move into the area of Sibiu. In these journeys, either that they have the „discreet surveillance of protection ‘ were filaţi, or ostenativ, as was the case, or” on the basis of recprocitate „relative to the treatment given to Romanian diplomats in the United Kingdom. In this way was identified interest ataşatului aero reaching Păltiniş, lonely, as Explorer map and compass, on the opposite slope on the access road. Intuindu-i-se direction, was established a „post by shadowing mountain” which documented the British military meeting ataşatului at a stână with Noica. A meeting, for neavizaţi, condiţiuni absolutely beyond any suspicion. Baciul stânei i received and omenit, they sang the whistle and famed with tulnicul, you have to leave that to know aid on coclauri to protect dogs and wolves …
His relationship with the British special services Noica was before the second world war. His first wife, Wendy Mouston (former miss Sinaia), was the post in Romania, as sent to Intelligence Service. Together with parents [Walter and Carola, née Ungarth, daughter of a hotelier sinaian] he lived in Sinaia, these being among the founders of the Alpine Bucegilor, which has important characters in the elite co-production involving policy and military of Romania. The Division was a continuatoare Carpatina society, Sinaia, founded in 1893 by the former Monastery of staret Sinaia, arhimandritul Cash, Take Ionescu and his first wife, cetăţeana British Bessie Richards. The foundation of such companies, tourist, sporting, cultural-scientific formed part of the good and generous tradition of British espionage.
Noica was included in a famous ‘ lot of British spies in Romania „, known as” Tomaziu „as the network name of the Chief of them, the agent of espionage English in Romania, which has received the rank of colonel and a seeming lifelong rent, as recognition of services to the Crown of the British Empire. Tomaziu was extracted from Romania, intervenindu on official channels [Julien Amery – Emil Bodnaras] in order to be approved, leaving the country.
Dealings with the authorities, Noica was, at least apparently, a conformism copy, always responsive and leaping, if able to contribute to progress and improve the perception of the West on his country.
You visit frequently on Aurel Cioran to Sibiu, which invite to church on Sunday, and then it was withheld from him at the table. „Relu” Cioran holding the links from the very beginning with his brother, located in Paris, who shared about friendship linked with Noica. Emil Cioran, in turn, with Mircea Eliade, George Palade and with other major Romanian over the ocean. So appeared the context favourable to a „recovery operations” filosofului Emil Cioran and the largest historical religions, Professor Mircea Eliade. The latter wished to return to the country, where he lived his mother, înaintata respectable aged and seeking sustenance of the teacher. And Jack Kerouac and Eliade knew of retaining and fears. Noica, with the example of the school from Păltiniş and with its „expansion” contacts in the Western world has given impetus to give effect to such requests to the system on their return in the country. There are precedents existential philosophy Henri Coandă.
Only political tampering with the factor and shortsightedness of Elena Ceauşescu, in front of which the Secretary of the CC of PCR with propaganda kept to autoevidenţieze with „recovery” have done this to fail. Mircea Eliade put a condition of good sense: „Romanian Academy General my library, which is located in the” Aula Mircea Eliade „. Elena Ceauşescu was not agreed. Then did detour knowledge of lack of fair play, of the same Elena Ceauşescu, in case the Foundation Henri Coandă, which was to be formed after the death of existential philosophy, located in the Palace Coandă. Moreover, it was disbanded and the National Institute of scientific and technical Creation, whose Chairman was the great scholar.
Andrei Pleșu
Some of his „disciples” have been bother Noica what the master has left written posterităii about them. So is it that when they put his hand on „notebooks” they have published censored. Then, in the later stage, were concerned about toaletarea same of many volumes of the dossier Noica formed CNSAS (only those that do not prejudice the interests defended by British Intelligence Service).
Noica was not a durable! He was autodenunţat as a Squire, was that escapes the care administered to wealth. He was autoizolat, being disappointed that there were between intellectuals and many conflicts of interest, most often personal, selfish, ariviste that favorizau delaţiuni political purposes miserable: blocking external delegările, employment target, but the functions occupied by others, getting awards and tributes, decide to pârghiilor censorship to prevent the publication of the once powerful counterparts opponents of ideas, even helping to better decipher the censors „hidden” subversive messages. All they were part of a sociological reality pervertită ideological.
Noica was neither an anticommunist. Tolerance of ideological was as deep as his philosophical beliefs and idealism. I could not decela, in his case, at least in the last part of life, no Division of the loalităţii between Romania and England. On his show promoter ideals pure neutrality. Some ideals on which you could attach to the political objectives of alternative … But who could exploit the Noica for such purposes, with the greatest opportunities? The political regime in Romania 1980s doesn’t need „creators stari mood”, other than those of unanimităţii, as an expression of „unity of the nation, monolithic party, State, society and the driver (…)”.
There’s a temptation to be considered as Noica port-flag of „resistance”. Nothing fake! Romania 1980s era arhiplină „clubs of reflection”. Many oficializate in addition to the unions, associations, institutes or centres of research, including in addition to the privileged redacţii who had permission to place emphasis on cultural and artistic literary supplements, with serious rebates from the official dogma. Proliferaseră simbolistică modalities of artistic expression, which is reserved for iniţiaţilor. Jebeleanu in poetry, others in plastic and tapestry …
Rather, Noica was an illustrious example for export, in terms of ideological tolerance and freedom of opinion, that the arrangements ensure, in particular in the case of former sentenced for political crimes. His first wife, Wendy Mouston was active at the Department of the BBC Romanian. His son, Rafael Noica-Mouston, has chosen the path of Orthodox Christianity, as if it had known that over the years will return to the Abbot of a monastery in Transylvania. Family Mouston was closely linked to Romania at the beginning of last century.
Many other Brits have like nature, language, traditions and the souls of the inhabitants of Romania, condition, without which they cannot promote political interests here and the economic implications of the British Empire. If i call on some, i’ve wrongs on others. To riscam, however …
Archibald Gibson and T.w. Hatley led Department Intelligence Service in Romania, under cover of correspondents of the newspaper „Times”;
Desmond Dorand and Gertie Gellender, under cover Of Consular i have succeeded torque informative Gibson-Hatley;
CRS Reginal Hoare, Minister of the sea. Britain to Bucharest, ensured the connection with the large scale of agencies Bibescu;
A.C. Gardine de Castelain has been resident of the Intelligence Service, then the Service Executive Operations under cover of commercial director of the Petroleum Company „Unirea” [1927-1940]. Between 1940 and 1943 he served at the Division III SOE for Romania –, Istanbul. In 1943 he was parasştat in Romania, in a group of illegal action (with Metianu and Ivor Porter). Until 23 august 1944 were „the prisoners of the fancy” of Eugen Cristescu, which concealed German services;
Mac Larren acted under cover of Agency press Reuter;
Col. E.C. Tom Masterson was „general director at the company” Unirea „oil;
Colonel Ted Masterson ensure, from Cairo, touch radio with cladestina network of National Taranesc Party, headed by Iuliu Maniu;
Alexander Miller and Mary Vischer from „Astra Romana” acrimonious sabotage operations;
Maiorul Ivor Porter act under cover „Britih Council ‘ as a lecturer in English at the University of Bucharest;
Professor Hugh Seaton-Watson, submitted by the „British Council”, itinerant informative mission was filling. The sondat possibilities of remedy to the power of King Carol II;
Denis Wrigt, viceconsul at Constant logistical operations, claims of sabotage and facilitate the early entry clandestina in Romania agents S.O.E.;
Maiorul genius Davidson Houston, Deputy atasatului military has occupied the oil sabotage by path;
Colonel Bill Bailey, Chief of Station S.O.E. Istanbul, make forays on the territory of Romania for various clandestine operatiujni;
Julien Amery, Lieutenant in the ‘ 40s when, under filajul S.S.I, accomplish missions out of touch with agencies in Romania – and the Balkans at the Hotel Athene Palace from Bucharest and. .. CRS Julien Amery in the 1960s-70s, when il frequency on Emil Bodnaras, looking for a gates open Uk relations with China, and after 1990 on Ion Iliescu, Adrian Nastase, Ovidiu Musetescu … in with all other purposes.
CRS Julien Amery was received and by Nicolae Ceausescu, along with a delegation of Lords, which he led it. During the meeting with Ceausescu, Amery was supposed to raise the roman leader a list of 12 issues. After the Exchange amabilitatilor protocolare and the withdrawal of the press, after the expozeul’s Ceuasescu, Amery started to raise the issues you have ready „at home”.
As Nicolae Ceausescu was delegation Lords became increasingly surprinsa, uimita and admirativa, at the same time, the speed and depth of the roman leader reactiilor, Have answers to all probeme raised unbeatable prices.
After the question the eleventh Lord Amery has not continued.
Ceausescu, after a break of tunes, is: „I guess you would most interest you and the next appearance …”
And Ceausescu continue with the answer to the problem of twelfth grade student, that no one may raise Amery.
List of the issues of the British delegation found itself in permanent neutrality in a Briefcase, connected with an elegant lantisor of mana Lord Amery, by it could not be separated a minute …
Reliable agents had the British services and in the world of theatre and cinematography, among ideologilor party, which in December 1989 i distributed in key roles, then it has insured over governmental, parliamentary political times in the business world, in the management of banks, in staful international bodies. How can this be except the onoranta, if they have done nothing to stop the depravity of generalized condition of the people and of their motherland? Not somehow, on the contrary …?
Do not list too close to our days, but should not, however, i omitem on Denis Deletant and Jonathan Eyal … specializing in Romanian intelligentsia and whose manner brave to act, starting in 1990, i have the required attention to those avizati and not only …
Going back to School mentor from Paltinis, high in the hierarchy of the Romanian Communist Party there were people of a proper invoice intellectual, which could have dialog with Noica. Philosopher was noticeably toward them. As appreciated and ‘ qualitative ‘ revolution that led to the „denial” security negatiei. After release from prison have to check that investigators from security have been replace with „citizens whose apparent of worthiness should not be suspected, if not declared ideals are denied by the materiality of things savarsite (…)”
In the last years of his life, was to disciples to Noica „Villa 23” became somewhat disturbing and wanted a limitation of visits and the frequency thereof, but not taking effective measures to prohibit. Neither the State of health is not more ingaduia sa gazduiasca times to attend seminars.
If I had to get it at incadram on Noica from 1970s-1980s, in a series of secret service agents, could be classified as involuntary operator into a double game, with increased chances for service with more intelligence in the maintenance of investment initiative and control agent. It has belonged to the initiative from the very beginning, but the control we’ve reserved.
If Noica would still living and would learn what he wanted to be a disciple of the master file volumes, those remaining classified, and would revise the approach initially, and the Foundation „Nova”, through which Europe continues to be subventionat, could be excluded external funding.
Another disciple ii owes his Political legacy Noica, because the Publisher this gift did not come from the National Salvation Front, but following a request by a foreign leader outspoken front, from the Organization’s secret „Pinay Circle” [also known as „better” the circle „], founded in the 1950s by Antoine Pinay [former Prime Minister of France], along with former german Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and headed, at first, by Jean Violet [a famous figure of S.D.E.C.E., ehivalentul French C.I.A.]
„The circle” has had among the members of the basics: Julien Amery [responsible for the operations Inteligence Service in Romania and the Balkans], Brian Crozier, Nicholas Elliot [M.I. 6], William Colby [C.I.A.], General d. Stilwell [U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency], Edwin Feulner [The Heritage Foundation]
Pintre guests this secret club are listed: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, the Sultan of Oman, Ion Iliescu and King Hussein of Jordan.
[More recently, at the head of „the circle” was Lord Lamonte, Coordinator of the group, which acquired Bali wineries of aluminium in Oradea and Tulcea. Lamonte came in Romania accompanied by Julien Amery, the guarantor’s Ion Iliescu to „Circle”]
Structures of security in the 1980s
There were special units for operations aimed at the „intellectuals”. Under the direction of internal information (the constitutional order, political) collection of information for knowing the intention, plans and actions to extremist, revisionist and other subversive actions potrivinice political regime, in order to prevent them, was organized on the criterion of social activity areas and areas with a common denominator generau structure specialized collective (1-3 officers) Office (4-5 officers) service (minimum two offices). A service of the Department that have responsibility for academic institutions in direct and other cultural bodies, as well as the coordination of national activity at the level of entire countries, and RIM’s network or territorial offices, as the case may/colectivele, the desfasurau activity of information at the level of administrative-territorial units (territorial structure at the level of service „art-culture” exists only for the city of Bucharest)
Within the structures of the external activity was organiztă on the criterion of geographic areas (with the objective of spying and promotion/defense of Romanian State’s external intereslor) and a direction of activity of the emigration of all spaces (mostly political organizations, cultural, religious, former dignitaries from the interwar period), the main objective is getting chased by their emigration of Romanian foreign policy.
But to be fair and to point out, „for the correct and full information as to public opinion” as all the special services, and most generous tradition is that the British have their organizations activity targets of political, cultural, youth movements and intelligentsia, being created true pleiade of elites who boast of their privileged relations in the world of espionage and contra-espionaj.
GL. brg. (r), Aurel Rogojan
Şcoala de la Păltiniş” nu o putem expedia prin menţiuni lapidare. În ultimă instanţă, Noica, în calitate de „agent formator ideologic” sau de „război politic” al Intelligence Service, şi-a asumat misiunea să formeze un număr de 10 propagandişti ai sistemului de valori occidentale (în cazul celui britanic, nu putem vorbi nici măcar de unul catolic!). Fiecare din cei zece, la rândul său… şi tot aşa, mai departe, până la coagularea unei elite conducătoare.
Acum, să nu credem că Noica i-a adunat pe cei zece şi le-a ţinut prelegeri…
Adept fervent al teoriei elitelor, filosoful a fost uşor de sugestionat să creeze o şcoală în care să-şi formeze discipoli. Noica spunea : „Visez o şcoală în care să nu se predea, la drept vorbind, nimic. Să trăieşti liniştit şi cuviincios, într-o margine de cetate, iar oamenii tineri, câţiva oameni tineri ai lumii, să vină acolo spre a se elibera de tirania profesoratului. Căci totul şi toţi dau lecţii. Totul trebuie învăţat pe din afară şi pe dinafară, iar singurul lucru care le e îngăduit din când în când e să pună întrebări. Dar nu vedeţi că au şi ei de spus ceva, de mărturisit ceva? Şi nu vedeţi că noi nu avem întotdeauna ce să le spunem? Suntem doar mijlocitori între ei şi ei înşişi… Stări de spirit, asta trebuie dat altora; nu conţinuturi, nu sfaturi, nu învăţături.”
Asta trebuia să devina Noica, un creator de stări de spirit…
Se ajunsese la un pelerinaj al discipolilor, câteva zeci. O listă aproximativă ar cuprinde între 30 şi 50 de nume.
Constantă, importantă şi, cel mai adesea fără martori, a fost prezenţa în preajma lui Noica a doi dintre aceştia: Gabriel Liiceanu şi Andrei Pleşu.
La Păltiniş se organizau periodic şi seminarii. Acestea au fost frecventate, mai mult sau mai puţin constant de către [ordinea este cea alfabetica]: Paul Anghel, Constantin Barbu, Francisca Băltăceanu, Aurel Brumaru, Andrei Cornea, Alexandru Dragomir, Marta Gutu, Andrei Justin Hossu, Dan Iacob, Thomas Kleininger, Şerban Nicolau, Octavian Nistor, Ion Papuc, Monica Pillat, George Purdea, Victor Stoichiţă, Alexandru Surdu, Mihai Şora, Marin Tarangul, Sorin Vieru, Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu.
Noica credea sincer că, dacă va reuşi să creeze o elită, aceasta se va impune în structurile de conducere a societăţii şi va „schimba la faţă România”. Idealismul lui Noica a fost abil speculat. În cazul său i s-au avut în vedere profilul moral şi convingerile filosofice, efectele directe ale valorii sale intrinseci în formarea unor pesonalităţi, care să determine evoluţii social-politice cu sens şi semnificaţii istorice. Cam aşa lucra spionajul politic strategic în epoca războiului rece.
E bine de ştiut că atât Noica, cât şi alte mari personalităţi nu au respins nimic din ceea ce ei percepeau ca fiind constructiv, benefic şi necesar, potrivit convingerilor lor.
Gabriel Liiceanu şi Andrei Pleşu – mi-a relatat coordonatorul contraspionajului britanic din acea perioadă – şi-au sporit frecventa vizitelor la „Vila 23″ (foto) când Noica le-a evidenţiat posibilităţile sale de a-i sprijini să obţină burse de studii în Occident. Lunar, la sfârşit de săptămână, îi duceau alimente, presă şi veşti. În mansarda rezervată filosofului sau în plimbările prin împrejurimi, ascultau expozeele lui Noica, pe teme aparent întâmplătoare şi se legau dialoguri. Noica le punea probleme filosofice şi le evalua opiniile. Andrei Pleşu era discipolul ascultător şi silitor. Gabriel Liiceanu era mai îndrăzneţ, uneori chiar uşor impertinent, ceea ce iscă contradicţii.
Gabriel Liiceanu
Desigur, se ridică întrebarea: „Prin cine şi cum a perfectat Noica obţinerea burselor şi nominalizarea celor doi discipoli?”. Foarte ingenios, fără nicio implicare oficială, Noica a dat un semnal unor fundaţii germane din zona de ocupaţie britanica a R.F. Germania. Acestea, în numele interesului reciproc al dezvoltării bunelor relaţii romano-germane, au făcut toată treaba. Filiera nu au ştiut-o nici beneficiarii burselor.
Acum, firesc este să fiu interpelat în legătură cu modalitatea în care Noica, izolat la Păltiniş, putea comunica în exterior? Legătura lui Noica cu oamenii serviciilor speciale ale Majestatii Sale Regina Elisabeta a II-a a fost şi obiectul constatării flagrante. Ataşatul aero al Marii Britanii la Bucureşti obişnuia, asemenea altor membri ai Ataşaturii Militare sau ai ambasadei, să se deplaseze în zona Sibiului. În aceste deplasări, fie că aveau „supraveghere discretă de protecţie”, fie erau filaţi ostenativ, după cum era cazul, sau „pe baza de recprocitate”, raportat la tratamentul acordat diplomaţilor români în Marea Britanie. În acest mod, a fost identificat interesul ataşatului aero de a ajunge la Păltiniş, ca explorator singuratic, cu hartă şi busolă, pe versantul opus celui pe care se afla drumul de acces. Intuindu-i-se directia, a fost instituit un „post de filaj montan”, care a documentat întâlnirea ataşatului militar britanic cu Noica la o stână. O întâlnire, pentru neavizaţi, în condiţiuni absolut in afara oricăror bănuieli. Baciul stânei i-a primit şi omenit, le-a cântat din fluier şi i-a vestit cu tulnicul, când au dat să plece, ca să ştie ajutoarele de pe coclauri să-i apere de câini şi lupi…
Legătura lui Noica cu serviciile speciale britanice era anterioară celui de al doilea război mondial. Prima sa soţie, Wendy Mouston (fosta miss Sinaia), s-a aflat la post in România, ca trimisă a Intelligence Service. Împreuna cu părinţii [Walter şi Carola, născută Ungarth, fiica unui hotelier sinaian] a locuit la Sinaia, aceştia aflându-se printre fondatorii Secţiei Alpine a Bucegilor, care reunea importante personaje din elita politica şi militară a României. Secţia era o continuatoare a Societatii Carpatina Sinaia, fondata în anul 1893 de fostul staret al Mănăstirii Sinaia, arhimandritul Nifon, Take Ionescu şi prima sa soţie, cetăţeana britanică Bessie Richards. Fondarea unor asemenea societăţi turistice, sportive, cultural-ştiinţifice făcea parte din buna şi generoasa tradiţie a spionajului britanic.
Noica a fost inclus şi într-un celebru „lot al spionilor britanici în România”, cunoscut ca „reţeaua Tomaziu”, după numele şefului ei, agent al spionajului englez în România, care a primit gradul de colonel si o renta viagera, drept recunoaştere a serviciilor aduse Coroanei Imperiului Britanic. Tomaziu a fost extras din România, intervenindu-se pe canale oficiale [Julien Amery – Emil Bodnaras] pentru a i se aproba plecarea din ţară.
În raporturile cu autorităţile, Noica era, cel puţin aparent, de un conformism exemplar, întotdeauna receptiv şi săritor, dacă putea să contribuie la progresul şi îmbunătăţirea percepţiei Occidentului asupra ţării sale.
Îl vizita frecvent pe Aurel Cioran la Sibiu, care îl invita duminica la biserică, apoi îl reţinea la masă. „Relu” Cioran menţinea legăturile fireşti cu fratele său, aflat la Paris, căruia i-a relatat despre prietenia legată cu Noica. Emil Cioran comunica, la rândul său, cu Mircea Eliade, George Palade şi cu alţi mari români de peste ocean. Aşa a apărut contextul favorabil unei „operaţiuni de recuperare” a filosofului Emil Cioran şi a celui mai mare istoric al religiilor, profesorul Mircea Eliade. Acesta din urmă dorea să revină în ţară, unde trăia respectabila sa mama, înaintata în vârstă şi aflată în intretinerea profesorului. Şi Cioran şi Eliade aveau reţineri şi temeri. Noica, cu exemplul Şcolii de la Păltiniş, precum şi cu contactele sale „nestingherite” în lumea occidentală le-a dat imbold în da curs demersurilor regimului privind revenirea lor în ţară. Mai există şi precedentul savantului Henri Coandă.
Numai imixtiunea factorului politic şi obtuzitatea Elenei Ceauşescu, în faţa căreia secretarul CC al PCR cu propaganda a ţinut să se autoevidenţieze cu „recuperarea”, au făcut ca aceasta să eşueze. Mircea Eliade a pus o condiţie de bun simţ: „Donez biblioteca mea Academiei Române, unde să fie amplasată în „Aula Mircea Eliade”. Elena Ceauşescu nu a fost de acord. Apoi a făcut ocol ştirea lipsei de fair play, a aceleiaşi Elena Ceauşescu, în cazul Fundaţiei Henri Coandă, care trebuia să fie constituită, după moartea savantului, cu sediul în Palatul Coandă. Mai mult, s-a desfiinţat şi Institutul Naţional de Creaţie Ştiinţifică şi Tehnică, al cărui preşedinte fusese marele savant.
Andrei Pleșu
Unii dintre „discipolii” lui Noica au fost deranjaţi de ceea ce maestrul a lăsat scris posterităii despre ei. Aşa se face că atunci când au pus mâna pe „caiete” le-au publicat cenzurate. Apoi, în etapa ulterioară, au fost preocupaţi de toaletarea redărilor din numeroasele volume ale dosarului Noica ajunse la CNSAS (numai cele care nu prejudiciază interesele britanice apărate de Intelligence Service).
Noica nu a fost un rezistent! El s-a autodenunţat ca moşier, s-a bucurat că scapă de grija administrării averii. El s-a autoizolat, dezamăgit fiind ca între intelectuali existau şi multe conflicte de interese, cel mai adesea personale, egoiste, ariviste care favorizau delaţiuni politice cu scopuri mizerabile: blocarea de la delegările externe, ocuparea funcţiilor vizate, dar ocupate de alţii, obţinerea de premii şi titluri, sesizarea pârghiilor cenzurii pentru împiedicarea publicării confraţilor adversari de idei, chiar ajutarea cenzorilor să descifreze „mesajele subversive ascunse”. Toate acestea făceau parte dintr-o realitate sociologică pervertită ideologic.
Noica nu a fost nici un anticomunist. Toleranţa lui ideologică era la fel de profundă, ca şi idealismul convingerilor sale filosofice. Nu puteam decela, în cazul său, cel puţin în ultima parte a vieţii, nici o divizare a loalităţii între România şi Anglia. Comportamentul său afişa neutralitatea promotorului de idealuri pure. A unor idealuri pe care se puteau grefa obiective politice alternative… Dar cine putea să-l valorifice pe Noica în astfel de scopuri, cu cele mai mari şanse? Regimul politic din România anilor ’80 nu avea nevoie de „creatori de stari de spirit”, alţii decât cei ai unanimităţii, ca expresie a „unităţii monolitice dintre popor, partid, stat, societate şi conducător (…)”.
Exista tentaţia ca Noica să fie considerat un port-drapel al „rezistenţei”. Nimic mai fals! România anilor ’80 era arhiplină de „cluburi de reflecţie”. Multe oficializate pe lângă uniuni, asociaţii, institute sau centre de cercetări, inclusiv pe lângă redacţii privilegiate care aveau aprobări să scoată suplimente culturale şi literar artistice, cu serioase rabaturi de la dogma oficială. Proliferaseră modalităţile de expresie artistică simbolistică, rezervată iniţiaţilor. Jebeleanu în poezie, alţii în plastică şi tapiserie…
Mai degrabă, Noica a fost un ilustru exemplu pentru export, în ceea ce priveşte toleranţa ideologică şi libertatea opiniilor, pe care regimul le asigura, cu deosebire în cazul foştilor condamnaţi pentru infracţiuni politice. Prima lui soţie, Wendy Mouston era activă la Sectia Română a BBC. Fiul său, Rafael Noica-Mouston, a ales calea creştinismului ortodox, ca şi cum ar fi ştiut că peste ani va reveni stareţ la o mănăstire din Transilvania. Familia Mouston era strâns legată de România de la începutul secolului trecut.
Mulţi alţi britanici au îndrăgit natura, limbă, tradiţiile şi sufletele locuitorilor României, condiţie fără de care nu puteau să promoveze aici interesele politice şi cele economice ale Imperiului Britanic. Dacă i-am numi pe unii, i-am nedreptăţi pe alţii. Să riscam, totuşi…
Archibald Gibson şi May Hatley au condus Secţia Intelligence Service-ului în România, sub acoperirea de corespondenţi ai ziarului „Times”;
Desmond Dorand şi Gertie Gellender, sub acoperirea Sectiei Consulare i-au succedat cuplului informativ Gibson-Hatley;
Sir Reginal Hoare, ministrul Marii. Britanii la Bucureşti, a asigurat legatura cu agentii de mare anvergura din familia Bibescu;
A.C. Gardine de Castelain a fost rezident al Intelligence Service, apoi al Serviciului Operaţiunilor Executive, sub acoperirea de director comercial al Societăţii petroliere „Unirea” [1927-1940 ]. Între 1940-1943 a activat la Secţia a III-a SOE pentru Romnia, de la Istanbul. În 1943 a fost parasştat în România, într-un un grup de acţiune clandestină (cu Metianu şi Ivor Porter). Până la 23 august 1944 au fost „prizonierii de lux” ai lui Eugen Cristescu, care i-a ascuns de serviciile germane;
Mac Larren a actionat sub acoperirea Agentiei de presa Reuter;
Colonelul E.C. Tom Masterson a fost „director general la Societatea petroliera „Unirea”;
Colonelul Ted Masterson asigura , de la Cairo, legatura radio cu reteaua cladestina din Partidul National Taranesc, condusa de Iuliu Maniu;
Alexander Miller si Mary Vischer de la „Astra Romana” conduceau operatiunile de sabotaj ;
Maiorul Ivor Porter actiona sub acoperirea „Britih Council”, ca lector de limba engleza la Universitatea din Bucuresti;
Profesorul Hugh Seaton-Watson, trimis de „British Council” , indeplinea misiuni informative itinerante. A sondat posibilitatile de inlaturare de la putere a Regelui Carol al II-lea;
Denis Wrigt, viceconsul la Constanta, sustinea logistic operatiunile de sabotaj si facilita intrarea clandestina in Romania a agentilor S.O.E.;
Maiorul de geniu Davidson Houston, adjunct al atasatului militar s-a ocupat de sabotarea campurilor petroliere;
Colonelul Bill Bailey, seful Statiei S.O.E. de la Istambul , realiza incursiuni pe teritoriul Romaniei pentru diverse operatiujni clandestine;
Julien Amery, locotenent in anii ’40 cand, sub filajul S.S.I-ului, realiza misiuni de legatura cu agentii din Romnia si Balcani la Hotel Athene Palace din Bucuresti si… Sir Julien Amery in anii ’60 – ’70 , cand il frecventa pe Emil Bodnaras, pentru cautarea unei porti deschise relatiilor Marii Britanii cu China, iar dupa 1990 pe Ion Iliescu , Adrian Nastase , Ovidiu Musetescu …in cu totul alte scopuri.
Sir Julien Amery a fost primit si de Nicolae Ceausescu, impreuna cu o delegatie a Camerei Lorzilor, pe care a condus-o. In timpul intalnirii cu Ceausescu, Amery trebuia sa-i ridice liderului roman o lista de 12 probleme. Dupa schimbul amabilitatilor protocolare si retragerea presei, dupa expozeul lui Ceuasescu, Amery a inceput sa-I ridice problemele pe care le avea pregatite ” de acasa” .
Pe masura ce Nicolae Ceausescu raspundea, delegatia Camerei Lorzilor devenea tot mai surprinsa, uimita si admirativa, in acelasi timp, de rapiditatea si profunzimea reactiilor liderului roman, Avea raspunsuri imbatabile la toate probeme ridicate .
Dupa intrebarea a unsprezecea, lordul Amery nu a mai continuat.
Ceausescu , dupa o pauza de asteptare, intervine :”Cred ca v-ar mai interesa si urmatorul aspect…”
Si Ceausescu continua cu raspunsul la problema a douasprezecea, pe care Amery nu o mai ridicase.
Lista problemelor delegatiei britanice s-a aflat in permamenta intr-o servieta eleganta, legata cu un lantisor de mana lordului Amery , de catre acesta nu s-a despartit o clipa…
Agenti de nadejde au avut serviciile britanice si in lumea teatrului si a cinematografiei, in randul ideologilor de partid, pe care in decembrie 1989 i-a distribuit in roluri cheie, apoi le-a asigurat parcursul politic parlamentar ori guvernamental, in lumea afacerilor, la conducerea bancilor, in staful unor organisme internationale. Cat de onoranta poate fi aceasta consideratie , daca n-au facut nimic pentru stoparea degradarii generalizate a conditiei poporului si a patriei lor ? Nu cumva, dimpotriva… ?
Nu aduc lista prea aproape de zilele noastre, dar nu trebuie, totusi, sa-i omitem pe Denis Deletant si Jonathan Eyal… specializati in intelectualitatea romaneasca si a caror maniera temerara de a actiona , incepand din 1990, i-au impus atentiei celor avizati si nu numai…
Revenind la mentorul Scolii de la Paltinis , in inalta ierarhie a Partidului Comunist Roman au existat persoane de o buna factura intelectuala, care puteau avea dialog cu Noica. Filosoful era sensibil fata de acestia. Dupa cum a apreciat si „revolutia calitativa ‘ care a condus la „negarea negatiei securitatii”. Dupa eliberarea din inchisoare avea sa constate ca anchetatorii din securitate au fost inlocuiti cu „cetateni a caror aparente de onorabilitate nu ar trebui suspectate, daca idealurile declarate nu le sunt negate de materialitatea lucrurilor savarsite (…)”
In ultimii ani ai vietii lui Noica, pelerinajul discipolilor la „Vila 23″ devenise oarecum deranjant si se dorea o limitare vizitelor si frecventei acestora, dar nu s-au luat masuri efective de interzicere. Nici starea de sanatate nu-i mai ingaduia sa gazduiasca ori sa participe la seminarii.
Daca ar fi sa-l incadram pe Noica, cel din anii ’70-’80, intr-o tipologie de agent al serviciilor secrete, ar putea fi clasificat ca operator involuntar intr-un joc dublu , cu sanse sporite pentru serviciul cu mai multa investitie de inteligenta in mentinerea initiativei si controlul agentului. Initiativa le-a apartinut de la bun inceput , dar controlul ni l-am rezervat.
Daca Noica ar mai trai si ar afla ce a dorit sa afle un discipol din volumele dosarului maestrului , cele ramase clasificate, si-ar revizui demersul initial, iar Fundatia „Nova Europa”, prin care continua sa fie subventionat, ar putea fi exclusa finantarii externe.
Un alt discipol ii datoreaza lui Noica mostenirea Editurii Politice, fiindca acest cadou nu i-a venit de la Frontul Salvarii Nationale, ci urmare a unei solicitari externe catre un lider marcant al frontului, din partea organizatiei secrete „ Pinay Circle” [ cunoscuta mai bine „Cercul”], fondata in anii ’50 de Antoine Pinay [fost prim ministru al Frantei], impreuna cu fostul cancelar german Konrad Adenauer si condusa, la inceput, de Jean Violet [ o figura celebra a S.D.E.C.E., ehivalentul francez al C.I.A.]
„Cercul” i-a avut printre membrii de baza pe : Julien Amery [ responsabil pentru operatiunile Inteligence Service in Romania si Balcani ], Brian Crozier, Nicholas Elliot [ M.I. 6], William Colby [C.I.A.], generalul D.Stilwell [ U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency], Edwin Feulner [ The Heritage Foundation]
Pintre oaspeţii acestui club secret sunt menţionaţi: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Sultanul Omanului, Ion Iliescu şi regele Hussein al Iordaniei.
[Mai recent, la conducerea „Cercului” s-a aflat lordul Lamonte, coordonator al grupului Bali , care a achizitionat combinatele de aluminiu din Oradea si Tulcea. Lamonte a venit in Romania insotit de Julien Amery, girantul lui Ion Iliescu la „Cercul”]
Structuri ale Securităţii în anii ’80
Nu au existat unităţi speciale pentru operaţiuni care să vizeze „intelectuali”. În cadrul Direcţiei Informaţii Interne (apărarea ordinii politice constituţionale) culegerea informaţiilor pentru cunoaşterea intentiilor, planurilor si actiunilor extremiste, revizioniste si a altor actiuni subversive potrivinice regimului politic, in vederea prevenirii lor, era organizata pe criteriul domeniilor activitatii sociale, iar domeniile cu un numitor comun generau o structura specializata colectiv (1 – 3 ofiteri) birou ( 4 -5 ofiteri) serviciu ( minim doua birouri ). Un serviciu din directia amintita avea in raspundere nemijlocita institutiile academice si celelalte organisme culturale nationale, precum si coordonarea activitatii la nivelul intregii tari, iar serviile sau birourile /colectivele teritoriale, dupa caz, desfasurau activitatea de informatii la nivelul unitatilor administrativ-teritoriale ( structura teritoriala la nivel de serviciu „arta-cultura” exista numai pentru municipiul Bucuresti )
În cadrul structurilor externe activitatea era organiztă pe criteriul zonelor geografice (cu obiective de spionaj si promovarea/aparare a intereslor externe ale statului roman), iar o directie avea ca obiect de activitate emigratia din toate spatiile ( preponderent organizatiile politice, culturale, religioase, fosti demnitari din perioada interbelica s.a.) , principalul scop urmarit fiind obtinerea sustinerii de catre emigratie a politicii externe a Romaniei.
Dar să fim corecţi şi să precizăm, „pentru corectă şi cât mai completa informare a opiniei publice”, ca toate serviciile speciale, iar cea mai generoasă tradiţie este cea britanică, au ţinte ale activităţii lor organizaţiile politice, culturale, mişcările de tineret şi intelectualitatea, fiind create adevărate pleiade ale elitelor care se mândresc cu relaţiile lor privilegiate în lumea spionajului şi contraspionajului.
Gl. brg. (r) Aurel Rogojan
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